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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PHENOMENON

In his paper-in-chief, Erwin Chemerinsky usefully describes a
number of striking if unsurprising features that seem, at this early date, to

t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School; Visiting
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former Associate Dean David Moran; the Humanities Center at Wayne State University;
and Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Rosanna Mah and Dominique Nasr of Loyola Law
School provided frst-rate research assistance, and Allan Ides offered helpful comments.
Thanks also to Erwin Chemerinsky for contributing the essay that is the centerpiece of
this symposium, and to Bob Sedler and the Wayne State University Academy of Scholars
for inviting Dean Chemerinsky to present the lecture that formed the basis of his essay.
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characterize the Roberts Court.' Substantively, the Court has tended to
reach results that will please political conservatives (with the arguable
exception of decisions involving executive power in the "war on terror"),
including in particular significant constitutional and statutory decisions
favoring businesses over consumers and employees. 2 Institutionally, the
number of cases decided by the Court has shrunk; 3 many of those cases
have been decided by close votes; 4 and where they have, Anthony
Kennedy has almost always been on the winning side,5 suggesting that
Justice Kennedy has replaced retired Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor as the
6
Court's de facto most powerful Justice.
This essay will focus on another notable aspect of the still-nascent
Roberts Court, a procedural phenomenon hinted at but not directly
addressed in Dean Chemerinsky's paper. 7 The Court has, in several highprofile decisions, accomplished what I will refer to as "under-the-table
overruling," or "underruling" for short. Consider the following cases:
In Gonzales v. Carhart,8 the Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Act of 2003 against a due-process challenge. 9 Among several
grounds for challenging the statute was its absence of a "health
exception"-a provision allowing an otherwise-banned procedure when
necessary to protect the health of the pregnant woman. 10 Seven years
earlier, in Stenberg v. Carhart," the Court had invalidated a similar
1. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 974

(2008).
2. Id. at 962.
3. Id. at 948.
4. Id. at 953.
5. Id.
6. The sophisticated mathematical model employed by Paul Edelman and Jim
Chen-sophisticated, at least, in the eyes of this mathephobe-suggests that Justice
Kennedy (not Justice O'Connor) was "the most dangerous Justice" even on the Rehnquist
Court. Edelman and Chen measure "not only the importance of the swing vote ... but
also the ability of individual Justices to muster a majority coalition that unifies behind a
doctrinal standard or approach as expressed in a single opinion." Paul H. Edelman & Jim
Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Into the Sunset, 24 CONST. COMM. 199, 219
(2007); see also Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The
Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 63 (1996); Paul H.
Edelman & Jim Chen, "Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts about the Supremes as the
Sultans of Swing, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 219 (1996); Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most
DangerousJustice Rides Again: Revisiting the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 MiNN.
L. REv. 131 (2001).
7. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1.
8. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
9. Id. at 1638-39.
10. Id. at 1625.
11. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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Nebraska law in part because it lacked a health exception.' 2 The Court in
Stenberg had held that a health exception was necessary despite the
relative rarity of threats to a woman's health from the unavailability of
the banned procedure, stating that "the health exception question is
whether protecting women's health requires an exception for those
infrequent occasions."'13 Without attempting to distinguish Stenberg in
this respect, however, the Carhart majority, in an opinion written by
Justice Kennedy (who had dissented in Stenberg), held that the absence
of a health exception was subject only to case-by-case, "as-applied"
challenges because the plaintiffs had "not demonstrated that the Act
would be unconstitutional in a largefraction of relevant cases." 14 In
effect, the Carhart Court overruled-without saying so-Stenberg's
holding that abortion regulations must contain health exceptions so long
as the health of some women might otherwise be at risk.
In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life,15 the
Court held that applying the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 ("BCRA") 16 to prohibit certain "issue ads" funded by the plaintiffs
would violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 17 Section
203 of the BCRA bans corporate or union funding of "electioneering
communications"--political advertisements that run within a certain
number of days before a federal election and refer to candidates for
federal office-thus superseding prior statutory provisions that had been
interpreted to prohibit funding only of "express advocacy" for or against
19
federal candidates. 18 In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
decided four years earlier, the Court had upheld section 203 against a
facial challenge, ruling that Congress has a compelling interest in
prohibiting ads that do not engage in express advocacy if they "are the
functional equivalent of express advocacy"--that is, if they "are intended
to influence the voters' decisions and have that effect.",20 McConnell had
held that section 203 was not overbroad because "the record strongly
supports the.., conclusion" that most ads covered by the provision were

12. Id. at 945-46
13. Id. at 934 (emphasis added).
14. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1639 (emphasis added).
15. 127 S. Ct.. 2652 (2007).
16. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(2002).
17. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2673-74.
18. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, supra note 16; see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1976).
19. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
20. Id. at 206.
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the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy, 2' and that the provision
was not unconstitutionally vague because its requirements "are both
easily understood and objectively determinable. 22
In Wisconsin Right to Life, however, Chief Justice John Roberts
asserted in his principal opinion that in order for section 203 to pass First
Amendment muster, it could be applied only to ads that are "susceptible
of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate., 23 In so doing, the Chief Justice rejected
McConnell's focus on the intent and the effect of political ads to
determine if they are the "functional equivalent of express advocacy. 24
The alternative standard he articulated--"susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation" other than advocacy-would be met by few, if any, ads
not actually employing express advocacy; this standard thus gutted
McConnell's conclusion that section 203's prohibition of all
"electioneering communications" would not ban many instances of
protected speech and thus was not overly broad. 25 And, as Justice Scalia
pointed out in his separate opinion, 26 the Chief Justice made hash of
McConnell's holding that section 203 was not unconstitutionally vague
by replacing the statute's clear written standards with the amorphous
"susceptible of no reasonable interpretation" formula.27 Yet the Chief
Justice purported
merely to be applying McConnell rather than
28
overruling it.
In Parents Involved with Community Schools v. Seattle School
DistrictNo. 1,29 the Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to strike
down two public school systems' use of race as a factor in student
assignments for the purpose of achieving racial diversity in schools.30

21. Id. at 206-07.
22. Id. at 194.
23. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2667. Chief Justice Roberts' opinion was joined
only by Justice Alito. Id. Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred in the judgment but
joined an opinion written by Justice Scalia which argued, in essence, that McConnell
should be overruled. See id.at 2674 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
24. Id. at 2665.
25. Id. at 2667.
26. See id. at 2674, 2679-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
27. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2674, 2679-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
28. For a detailed assessment of Wis. Right to Life's effect on the jurisprudence of
campaign-finance reform, including an evaluation of what I've called the "underruling"
aspect of that decision, see Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's
DeregulatoryTurn in FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1064 (2008).
29. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
30. Id. at 2767-68.
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32
Four years earlier, in Grutter v. Bollinger31 and Gratz v. Bollinger, the
Court had upheld racial diversity as a sufficiently compelling interest to
support affirmative action in admissions to the law school and the
undergraduate college of a public university.3 3 Much of Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion for the Court in Parents Involved was devoted to
explaining why the public-school programs in question, unlike the plan
34
in Grutter,were not narrowly tailored enough to survive strict scrutiny.
But the Chief Justice also suggested, without explanation, that the
diversity rationale upheld in Grutter simply was inapplicable in the
context of elementary and secondary education, asserting that the Grutter
Court "relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher
education" such as "'the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment.' 35 The Chief Justice did not
explain why "expansive freedoms of speech and thought" were less
valuable in elementary and high schools than in universities; 36 nor, more
broadly, did he justify his suggestion that diversity was a compelling
interest in the latter context but not in the former. And while his opinion
never expressly precluded diversity as a compelling interest outside the
university environment, it strongly implied as much, remarking that
"reliance on Grutter cannot sustain" the public-school programs in
question even before it rejected those programs as insufficiently
narrowly tailored.3 7 Parents Involved thus seems arbitrarily to have
limited Grutterto its facts under the guise of applying it.
I think it is fair to say that the holding, the reasoning, or both in each
of Carhart, Wisconsin Right to Life, and Parents Involved is directly
inconsistent in some important way with the holding or reasoning of a
recent, high-profile Court precedent on the same legal issue-Stenberg,
McConnell, and Grutter, respectively. The inconsistencies cannot
honestly be justified by some material difference in facts between the

31. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
32. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
33. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 237-33; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268. In Gratz, the Court
invalidated the University of Michigan's use of race as a factor in undergraduate
admissions because the particular program in question was not sufficiently narrowly
tailored; but the Court nonetheless recognized diversity as a compelling interest in the
undergraduate context. See id. at 268, 275.
34. See ParentsInvolved, 123 S. Ct. at 2759-61.
35. Id. at 2754 (quoting Grutter,539 U.S. at 329).
36. And, in any event, he took this quote from Grutter out of context. The Grutter
Court evoked the "special niche" occupied by universities "in our constitutional
tradition" not to argue that universities have a unique interest in diversity, but rather to
justify judicial deference to the expertise of university administrators and faculty with
respect to the benefits of their admissions policies. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29.
37. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755.
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cases in each pair; their only plausible explanation is, rather, a crucial
intervening change in the Court's personnel. Justice O'Connor had voted
with the majority in Stenberg, McConnell, and Grutter;3 8 her
replacement, Justice Samuel Alito, voted with the majority in Carhart,
Wisconsin Right to Life, and Parents Involved;39 and Justice Kennedy,
the Court's new swing vote, had dissented in each of the former cases but
joined the majority in each of the latter.40 Simply put: the causal force
behind the different result in each case was Justice Alito's replacement
of Justice O'Connor.
By itself, the idea that changes in Court personnel can bring changes
in constitutional doctrine should not be surprising; it need not even be
especially problematic, as I suggest in Part IV below. What makes these
decisions troubling, however, is not that they changed doctrine, but that
they did so without admitting it. In none of these decisions did the author
of the principal opinion acknowledge that all or part of a precedential
case was being overruled. These decisions, I believe, are examples of
"under-the-table overruling," or "underruling." In each of them, the
Court effectively gutted a core aspect of some recently decided precedent
without confessing that it was doing so.
The phenomenon of under-the-table overruling raises at least two
interesting and closely related questions. First, if the Court is deciding in
a way that is in fact inconsistent with recent precedent, why does it not
simply say so-that is, formally overrule that precedent in whole or in
part? Second, is there anything normatively problematic about the
practice of under-the-table overruling?
In this essay I will sketch an answer to this second, normative
question and, in so doing, suggest also some possible answers to the first,
descriptive one. My intuitive reaction, as a lawyer and law professor, to
the idea of underruling is that it is somehow unseemly, and I suspect
many readers of this essay will share that reaction. But is there really
anything wrong with the practice, and if so, what? Underruling carries a
whiff of judicial dishonesty, but is this kind of judicial dishonesty really
all that bad? Lawyers know that judges often fib-when they write
opinions to suggest that a particular result is mechanically dictated by
text or precedent, for instance, a claim that is almost never true, at least
not in constitutional cases. Some degree of judicial dishonesty might be
necessary to grease the wheels of the system. Does underruling fall into
this category of relatively benign deceit?
38. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 914; McConnell, 540 U.S. 93; Grutter,539 U.S. 306.
39. See Carhart,550 U.S. 124; Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652; Parents Involved,
127 S.Ct. 2738.
40. See supra text accompanying note 38; see also id.
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In normatively assessing the practice of underruling, it will be
helpful first to come to grips with the underlying practice of
constitutional stare decisis, of following precedent in cases involving
constitutional issues. What is the point of constitutional precedent, and
does underruling somehow undermine that point? If so, this would
provide a reasoned normative objection to underruling.
In Part II, I canvass two plausible rationales for the Supreme Court's
practice of following its own precedential decisions in constitutional
cases. I note that the practice of underruling seems to be inconsistent
with at least one of these rationales in a way that straight overruling is
not. I also describe a third, somewhat more nuanced rationale for
constitutional stare decisis, one suggested by the Court itself in an
influential (and controversial) discussion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.4 1 In Part III, I sketch an account of the function of constitutional
adjudication that might support the Casey rationale. In Part IV, I argue
that while the practice of underruling superficially seems compatible
with this Casey-inspired account, that impression is illusory. In fact,
underruling threatens to diminish, over time, the legitimacy of the Court
as a constitutional decisionmaker, which is precisely the result the Casey
rationale seeks to avoid. In Part V, I speculate a bit about why the Court
might dabble in underruling despite its risks.
II. WHY CONSTITUTIONAL STARE DECISIS?
Is the practice of underruling compatible with the practice of stare
decisis that seems to animate it? Or is the Court, by overruling
constitutional precedent without saying so, undermining the efficacy of
precedent itself? In particular, is there something about underruling that
is more threatening to constitutional stare decisis, and to the reasons that
justify it, than straight overruling? The answer must turn in part on what
those justificatory reasons are.
A. The NoninstrumentalRationale
One possible justification of constitutional stare decisis is that there
is something inherently valuable or good or just about treating like cases
alike.4 2 We can call this the NoninstrumentalRationale for constitutional
precedent. On the Noninstrumental Rationale, deciding similar
41. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
42. For an explication and critique of some arguments to this effect, see Christopher
J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105
YALE L.J. 2031 (1996).
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constitutional cases similarly is simply the morally right thing to do; or,
to be more precise, there are strong inherent moral reasons to decide
similar constitutional cases similarly, even if those reasons might on
occasion be outweighed by countervailing ones (e.g., the egregious
incorrectness of a precedential decision).43
There is cause to be gravely suspicious of the Noninstrumental
Rationale. It turns out to be very difficult to make a convincing case that
treating like cases alike has any inherent moral value; in virtually every
instance in which this idea of consistency seems to carry weight, that
weight can be explained either by instrumental considerations like those
discussed in the next section, or by normative factors that apply to each
44
case individually, without regard to how another case has been treated.
But let us assume, for present purposes, that the Noninstrumental
Rationale has merit. It seems rather clear that the practice of underruling
is unsupported by that rationale. The Noninstrumental Rationale suggests
adhering to rather than overruling precedent. But underruling is not
adhering to precedent; it is only pretending to adhere to precedent, that
is, overruling precedent without saying so. If stare decisis has inherent
moral value, that value is lost when the Court in fact fails to treat like
cases alike, whether or not the Court admits its failure or succeeds in
(falsely) convincing others that it is treating likes alike. What is
important to the Noninstrumental Rationale is not the perception of
consistency, but actual consistency.
Of course, the Court may, in any given case, have good (moral)
reasons not to treat like cases alike: the harm or wrong of following an
egregiously incorrect precedent, for example. Those reasons might be
strong enough, in some cases, to justify the Court's overruling of a
precedent. And perhaps sometimes there will be good reasons for the
Court not only to overrule a precedent, but also to pretend not to do so.
But those reasons, if they exist, will be counterweights to the
Noninstrumental Rationale, not products of it. The Noninstrumental
Rationale itself can justify neither overruling nor underruling precedent,
and it certainly cannot justify underruling in place of overruling.

43. See id. at 2040-41, 2043-44, 2047-50.
44. There is a sizable literature, to which I have made a small contribution, on the
question whether "treating likes alike" has inherent moral value. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 217-44 (1986); PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF "EQUALITY" IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE
(1990); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982);

Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of EgalitarianNorms, 80 B.U. L. REv. 693 (2000);
Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1997); Peters, supra
note 42.
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At the same time, however, there seems no reason to think that
underruling poses any greater threat to the Noninstrumental Rationale
than does straightforward overruling. As I suggest below and in Part IV,
the real-world consequences of underruling may differ in important
respects from those of overruling; but this does not matter on the
Noninstrumental Rationale, which is concerned solely with the inherent
moral value of stare decisis, not with its consequences. If deciding like
cases alike constitutes an intrinsic moral good, that good is compromised
whenever like cases are decided differently, whether that is accomplished
openly or surreptitiously.
B. The PredictabilityRationale
Another way to justify constitutional stare decisis-the Predictability
Rationale-is on certain instrumental grounds relating to the value of
legal predictability. A robust practice of adhering to precedent means
that people can predict with reasonable accuracy how similar cases will,
or would, be decided in the future. That predictability might produce a
number of benefits of the type associated, more broadly, with the
existence of relatively clear legal rules.4 5 Predictability can foster
efficiency by avoiding or minimizing conflict over what legal standards
will apply in particular circumstances: If people accurately can predict
the legal consequences of their and others' actions, they will be less
likely to bring costly lawsuits or criminal prosecutions, or costly claims
or defenses within existing court cases, in order to adjudicate those
consequences, and those lawsuits or prosecutions that are brought can be
resolved more easily. Legal predictability also can promote individual
autonomy and, in the constitutional context, collective democracy:
Individuals who know the likely legal consequences of their actions, and
democratic majorities that know the likely legal consequences of theirs,
can more confidently plan their affairs without worrying about legal
liability. Finally, legal predictability can promote fairness by preventing
individuals (or democratic majorities) from being penalized46for conduct
they did not know was problematic when they engaged in it.
45. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RuLES: MORALITY,
RuLES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001) (discussing the benefits (and pathologies) of
legal rules more broadly); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL
CONFLICT (1996) (discussing same).
46. In this respect, however, we should keep in mind that reliance on precedential
decisions would not be justified, and thus overruling would not be unfair, in a legal
system that did not include a robust practice of following precedent. Fairness serves as a
reason against overruling in a system that employs stare decisis; it does not constitute a
reason for adopting such a system in the first place.
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As I suggest below, underruling probably is no more consistent than
outright overruling with these predictability-related benefits of stare
decisis, and it may be less consistent with them.
1. Efficiency
Consider efficiency first. If underruling works, in the sense of
actually overruling a precedent without being seen (by anyone but the
Court) as doing so, it seems to pose no threat to efficiency. People will
continue to treat the (supposedly) precedential decision as binding and
will act accordingly, avoiding behavior that runs afoul of that decision;
likewise, lower-court judges will continue to apply the (supposedly)
precedential decision, thus avoiding the costs of formulating or
speculating about the proper legal rule. But it is difficult to envision
underruling actually "working" in this way. Future parties (private and
government actors) and judges will, after all, have an additional Supreme
Court decision to contend with besides the original precedential decision
(Dp), namely the decision that accomplishes the underruling (Du). If Du
is in fact inconsistent with some central aspect of Dp, despite the Court's
not having said so, subsequent parties (or their lawyers) and subsequent
judges eventually will figure this out. (Indeed, it seems unlikely that the
Court would go to the trouble of underruling, rather than simply adhering
in fact to Dp, unless it intends that Du itself will have some precedential
effect. 47) Presented with two logically incompatible but nominally
consistent Supreme Court decisions, Dp and Du, subsequent parties and
judges will have to guess which decision the Court is likely to follow in
future cases. The uncertainty and controversy on that point will
undermine the efficiency goal of stare decisis.
And note that underruling probably threatens efficiency to an even
greater degree than straightforward overruling does. If the Court openly
overrules a precedent, the result may be to shake people's confidence in
the reliability of precedent generally, thus fomenting uncertainty and
47. There is at least one circumstance in which the Court might underrule a precedent,
Dp, without intending the underruling decision, Du, to have its own precedential effect: If
the case producing Du is seen by the Court as sufficiently unique to justify a failure to
follow Dp in that one case only. Some commentators believe the Court's controversial
decision in Bush v. Gore was such a case; there the Court stretched its equal-protection
and justiciability precedents to order a halt to the recount of presidential votes in Florida,
while in effect disclaiming any precedential effect for the decision itself. See Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109-10 (2000) ("Our consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities."). For an assessment of Bush v. Gore along these lines, see
Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CM. L. REv. 757, 769-72 (2001).
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controversy and undermining efficiency. But there is likely to be at least
some confidence that the particular overruling decision (Do) will not
itself be overruled in the near future. The legal rule generated by Do, that
is, will be perceived as relatively stable and its application relatively
predictable (except to the extent that the stability and predictability of all
Court-generated legal rules are called into question by an act of
overruling). In contrast, underruling not only threatens confidence in the
general reliability of precedent, just as overruling does; it also creates
confusion about the particular legal issue decided in the underruling case.
When the Court underrules, future parties and judges have two
conflicting legal rules - that generated by Dp and that generated by Dv-to contend with, both of which the Court professes to be valid law. The
inefficiency fostered by underruling thus is likely to be both
macrocosmic and microcosmic.
2. Autonomy and Democracy
Partly for this reason, underruling also appears to threaten individual
autonomy and democratic self-government to a greater extent than
straight overruling does. Faced with two conflicting, and supposedly
equally valid, constitutional rules, individuals and government officials
will find it difficult to make and carry out their plans confidently.
And underruling threatens autonomy even if it somehow "works,"
that is, even if individuals and democratic officials are fooled into
thinking Du is in fact consistent with Dp. This is because both individual
autonomy and democratic self-government seem to depend, not on the
relevant actor's belief that it is controlling its own fate, but on the
relevant actor's actually controlling its own fate. "Autonomy" literally
means "self-law-giving"; on a common understanding, associated with
Kant, the individual exercises autonomy to the extent she governs herself
through the choices she makes.48 Choices made based on false
assumptions are not autonomous choices in this sense (except perhaps to
the extent those false assumptions themselves are products of the
individual's free choice). An individual who is convinced, through no
fault of her own, that she has the ability to defy gravity, and who steps
off a high-rise balcony based on this false belief, is not making an
autonomous choice by doing so. Similarly, an individual who believes
(through no fault of her own) that the legal rule announced in Dp
constitutes valid law, and who acts based on that belief, has not
autonomously chosen the consequences when it turns out that Du has
48. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 98-99 (H.J.
Paton ed., 1964).
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surreptitiously invalidated the rule of Dp. The same can be said of
democratic majorities: They are not exercising true self-governance if the
legal premises upon which they base their choices are, through no fault
of their own, false ones.
3. Fairness
As these observations suggest, underruling also may frustrate the
goal of fairness in a way that straight overruling does not. In a system
characterized by general adherence to precedent, straight overruling
might be unfair because it frustrates people's (that is, individual actors'
and democratic governments') reasonable expectations about the content
of constitutional law. 49 But at least straight overruling frustrates
expectations openly; in so doing it tempers future expectations and thus
mitigates the unfairness of subsequent overrulings. Every time a Dp is
expressly overruled by a Do, the reasonable expectations of the public
and the government change (or should change) to allow a little more
room for the possibility of overrulings in the future. Future overrulings
then become a bit less likely to frustrate reasonable expectations and thus
a bit less unfair.
If the Court overrules Dp sub rosa with Du, however, the signal that
the Court sometimes overrules constitutional precedent is not clearly
sent. People may continue to rely-reasonably but, as it turns out,
falsely-on the unlikelihood of overrulings, only to have their
expectations frustrated by a future Do or Du. In this macrocosmic sense,
underruling is more unfair than overruling. And, microcosmically,
underruling Dp with Dur--unlike overruling it with Do-will (again,
assuming it works) leave the impression that Dp remains good law, thus
49. We should not assume, though, that overruling always, or even typically, is unfair
in this way. If overruling occurs occasionally, people will (or should) temper their
expectations with this fact. It would be unreasonable to rely on the idea that the Court
never overrules its precedents. And, as constitutional lawyers and scholars know, the
Court rarely overrules precedents out of the blue; typically it first lays the groundwork for
an overruling by limiting or chipping away at the precedential decision in various ways.
So, for example, the Court spent roughly a generation shrinking the scope of the
"separate but equal" doctrine laid down in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in a
series of decisions before finally rejecting that doctrine in Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), and subsequent cases. See Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337 (1938) (invalidating state policy of paying for black students' attendance at
public law schools in neighboring states rather than admitting them to state's own law
school); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (finding hastily established blacks-only
law school is insufficient to satisfy separate-but-equal); and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950) (invalidating a policy of physically segregating
black graduate students within a state university).
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encouraging reasonable (but false) reliance on Dp and risking greater
unfairness if the Court, in a subsequent decision, fails to follow Dp.

It is not simply the case, then, that the Predictability Rationale (or
family of rationales) for stare decisis fails to provide greater support for
underruling than for overruling, as the Noninstrumental Rationale fails to
do. Underruling is in fact less compatible than overruling with the
Predictability Rationale. The benefits of predictability-efficiency,
individual autonomy and democratic self-government, fairness-are
threatened to a greater degree by underruling than by straightforward
overruling of precedent.
C. The Legitimacy Rationale
There is a third plausible rationale for the practice of stare decisis,
one that applies (if it applies at all) with special force in constitutional
cases.5 ° This Legitimacy Rationale was described by the Court itself in a
well-known and controversial portion of its (pre-Roberts) 1992 opinion
in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.5 1 In Casey, the Court affirmed what it
characterized as the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade-that a woman
has a right to terminate her pregnancy, subject to reasonable health and
safety concerns and to the government's interest in protecting the life of
a viable fetus-and struck down Pennsylvania's spousal-notification
requirement while upholding informed-consent, waiting-period, parentalnotification, and recordkeeping requirements.52 In explaining its refusal
to overturn Roe, the Court referred extensively to the kinds of
instrumental, predictability-based concerns described above, holding that
various countervailing considerations (factual or legal obsolescence,
practical unworkability) were insufficient to outweigh those concerns.53
But the Court also went farther. In a remarkable passageremarkable because it directly engaged the question of the Court's role in
a constitutional democracy to a degree rarely seen in majority opinions

50. There may be other rationales as well, but these three strike me as the most
plausible.
51. 505 U.S. at 864-69. The passage in question is Part III.C. of the joint opinion
authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter; that portion of the opinion was
joined by a majority of the Court. Id. Several other portions of the joint opinion were
joined only by a plurality of the Court. Id. at 841-42.
52. Id. at 846-901.

53. See id. at 854-64.
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of the Court 54-it argued that overruling Roe would undermine the
Court's own legitimacy. 55
The Court's power, it asserted in Casey, "lies ...in its legitimacy, a

product of substance and perception., 56 In tying its legitimacy to
"substance," the Court appeared to mean that part of its power depends
on widespread public acceptance of the content of its decisions, on the
impression that the Court is getting things right most (or at least an
acceptably high percentage) of the time. 57 In citing "perception,"
however, the Court meant something different and perhaps more
complex. Some segment of the public inevitably will disagree with the
substance of any constitutional decision by the Court; as the Court put it,
"not every conscientious claim of principled justification [for a Court
decision] will be accepted as such.",58 Thus "something more"-more
than agreement with the substance of Court decisions-"is required" to
support the Court's power. 59 That something more is a widespread
perception that the Court is procedurally legitimate, that the way it
makes constitutional decisions is generally acceptable, even to those who
disagree with the substance of particular decisions. 60 And this procedural
legitimacy "depends on making legally principled decisions," decisions
that are "grounded truly in principle, not ...

compromises with social

and political pressures." 61 Frequent overrulings of the Court's own
constitutional precedents-or overrulings of highly controversial
decisions that have produced extraordinary "social and political
pressures," like Roe-would foster the impression that the Court 62
is
principle.
of
decisions
making
than
rather
pressures
those
to
in
giving
This "would subvert the Court's legitimacy" and thus its power.63
The central thrust of the Casey Court's Legitimacy Rationale for
constitutional stare decisis, then, is this: Much of the Court's authorityits capacity to cause others (including the political branches of
government) to implement and obey its decisions-rests on a widespread
54. Rarely enough, in fact, that those occasions on which the Court openly assesses
its place in the constitutional system, in a way that goes beyond conclusory assertions and
sound bites, tend to find their way into constitutional law casebooks for reasons other
than the substance of the Court's decision. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
55. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 865-66.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-66 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 867.
63. Id. at 866-67 (quoted text on 867).
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public belief that the Court is making those decisions in a certain way.
More specifically, the public and the political branches obey the Court's
constitutional decisions because, and to the extent that, they believe the
Court is basing those decisions on principle rather than on utilitarian
political or social considerations. Frequent overruling of constitutional
precedent, or overruling of especially controversial precedents, creates
the impression that the Court is deciding based on something other than
principle. This threatens the perception of the Court's legitimacy that is
essential to its authority. Hence, the Court should avoid, or at least have
very good countervailing reasons for, overruling constitutional
precedents, particularly on highly controversial topics.
There is a salient and potentially powerful line of objection to this
Casey reasoning, namely that Casey assumes a normatively problematic
relationship between the Court's legitimacy and public opinion. The
central worry here is that the question of how the Court should decide
cases ought not to turn on how the public thinks the Court should decide
cases. The Court as an institution is structured to be relatively insulated
from popular opinion: Its members, while appointed by a highly
politicized process, never are subject to popular election and remain on
the Court (barring an impeachable offense) until they die or choose to
retire. 64 If public opinion is to play an important role in constitutional
decisionmaking, it thus is unclear why the relatively unaccountable
Court, as opposed to the considerably more accountable elective
branches, should be making those decisions. The very idea of
constitutionalism, moreover, seems to suppose a set of legal norms that
are resistant to transitory shifts in public opinion, a supposition that
appears to be threatened if the Court makes constitutional decisions in
part by reference to that opinion.
By tethering its own legitimacy to public perceptions, the Casey
Court therefore seems to be questioning the central premises of
constitutionalism and judicial review. This basic concern underlies many
criticisms of the Legitimacy Rationale, including that leveled by Justice
Scalia in his scathing dissent in Casey.65 If the criticisms are right-if
Casey's Legitimacy Rationale for constitutional stare decisis is logically
incoherent or normatively bankrupt-then there is not much point in
asking whether the practice of underruling is compatible with that
rationale. As I argue in the next Part, however, there is a plausible vision
of the Court's role in our constitutional democracy that supports the
Legitimacy Rationale against these objections.
64. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
65. See 505 U.S. at 979, 996-1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION AS DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The Casey analysis forces us to ask the following fundamental
question: What, if anything, makes the Supreme Court's constitutional
decision-making legitimate?
Before we get to that question, I should make a semantic
clarification. Although the terms "authority" and "legitimacy" often are
used interchangeably in ordinary language, and sometimes are used in
conjunction (as in "legitimate authority"), legal and political
philosophers tend to treat them as distinct if related concepts. David
Estlund, for example, defines authority as "the moral power of one agent
(emphasizing especially the state) to morally require or forbid actions by
others through commands," and legitimacy as "the moral permissibility
of the state's issuing and enforcing its commands owing to the process
by which they were produced., 66 So, says Estlund, "[i]f the state's
requiring you to pay taxes has no tendency to make you morally required
to do so, then the state lacks authority in that case. And if the state puts
you in jail for not paying,
but it is morally wrong for it to do so, then it
67
acts illegitimately.,
Estlund's distinction will suffice for our purposes, particularly since
I will treat authority and legitimacy as coextensive in the remainder of
this essay. 68 I will assume in what follows that a Court decision that is
legitimate (i.e., morally permissible owing to the process that generated
it) also is, for the same reasons, authoritative (i.e., tending to make the
person subject to it morally required to obey it); and I will use the terms
"authority" and "legitimacy" more or less interchangeably.

66. DAVID M. EsTLuND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 2

(2008).
67. Id.
68. It is conceivable that legitimacy may sometimes exist without authority-that it
may be morally right both for the state (or, for our purposes, the Court) to command you
to do something, and for you to disregard that command. (For an extensive and useful
discussion of this possibility, see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 45, at 53-95.) If
such instances occur, however, they are likely to be relatively few and far between,
especially if we acknowledge that even if the Court has authority, that authority
sometimes may be overridden by competing moral considerations. (The possibility of
morally justified civil disobedience, for one, seems to require such an acknowledgment.)

If we acknowledge this, then an instance in which it is morally permissible to disobey a
legitimate Court decision-because, for example, obeying it would result in profound

moral wrong or harm-is not necessarily an instance in which that decision lacks
authority. The decision may be both legitimate and authoritative and still be overridden
by countervailing moral reasons.

2008]

UNDER-THE- TABLE 0 VERR ULING

1083

A. A Dispute-ResolutionAccount
With this prologue, imagine what I will call a Dispute-Resolution
Account of constitutional adjudication. On the Dispute-Resolution
Account, a central function of constitutional adjudication (not necessarily
its only function) is to provide acceptable avoidance or resolution of
potentially costly disputes involving certain kinds of questions. For our
purposes, we need not linger over the problem of exactly which kinds of
questions qualify; likely candidates include issues involving the meaning
and terms of democratic government or claims that certain individual or
minority interests are immune to sacrifice for the common good. What
characterizes both of these types of questions is the apparent
unacceptability of trusting their resolution to the very process that they
are questioning about.69 Allowing a majority of democratic citizens to
decide, for example, whether a certain minority are disqualified from full
citizenship seems like self-judging, and as such is unlikely to be
acceptable to the excluded minority. Allowing a majority of the public to
determine whether an individual's interest in proving her innocence may
be sacrificed to national security seems to present the same problem.
There are many similar examples, real and imaginable, that are suggested
by a glance through the case law under the rights-bearing provisions of
our Constitution.70
69. The notion that judicial review might be justified as serving a sort of referee's
function, policing the democratic process to avoid or remedy distortions in that process,
was of course inspired by the Court's famous "footnote four" in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), and has been developed most
influentially by John Hart Ely. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JuDIcIAL REVIEW (1980). I suspect that the scope of constitutional
adjudication on the Dispute-Resolution Account, as I outline it here, is somewhat broader
than a pure Elyian account would allow. For example, Ely was critical of the Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), arguing that it could only be explained by
the Court's substitution of its own substantive moral or political preferences for those of
the democratic majority. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). But, if one views the question of abortion and
other issues of physical and sexual autonomy as problems of individual claims of
immunity from the majority's calculation of the public interest, one might defend the
Court's intervention (if not necessarily the result of that intervention) as an attempt to
resolve a dispute that could not be resolved impartially by majoritarian politics.
70. The Dispute-Resolution Account also might justify the Court's enforcement of the
Constitution's structural provisions-those establishing the institutions and procedures of
government-although in a more modest and, I think, less controversial way. Many
structural provisions address issues that simply need to be resolved one way or another
for democratic government to function; in many cases it is more important that these
issues be resolved than that they be resolved correctly. Some degree of judicial
enforcement of structural constitutional provisions thus seems necessary simply to
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The American system of constitutional adjudication might be
justifiable in part as a way to solve, or at least to mitigate, the selfjudging problems that afflict these kinds of questions. The existence of a
written Constitution subjects these issues to norms generated by
Americans of previous generations and publicly approved using a
supermajoritarian process. This injects a certain impartiality into the
process of deciding the issues: The decision is at least partly governed,
not by a political majority or some other faction from among the "people
of the here and now" 7 1-which would be an act of self-judging-but
rather by the people of an earlier generation. 72 That impartiality might be
reinforced by assigning the task of interpreting and applying these
written constitutional provisions (which, it turns out, typically are vague
and open-ended) to an institution, the Court, whose members are
insulated to a degree from everyday majoritarian politics and thus are
less susceptible to self-judging than an unfettered political majority
would be.
Of course, the relative impartiality of constitutional adjudication as
compared to majoritarian politics probably is not sufficient, by itself, to
confer plausible dispute-resolving authority on that process. For one
thing, the impartiality of the process will be imperfect even in the best of
real-world scenarios. Supreme Court Justices typically, and perhaps even
constitutional Framers sometimes, have a stake in the controversies they
help decide; they too are members of our society (or, in the case of the
Framers, of an earlier society facing issues similar to our own) and thus
were or will be bound by the decisions they make. As such, the judging
they provide cannot be entirely neutral. That in itself may not be a fatal
problem, so long as we can say that constitutional adjudication is
significantly more impartial than majoritarian politics as a way to decide
a particular issue.
The larger problem is that a procedure that is impartial, tout courtwithout anything else to recommend it-is unlikely to be acceptable as a
constitute democratic government. There are of course many subtle difficulties here, but I
believe they pale in comparison to the difficulties associated with judicial enforcement of
constitutional rights against the democratic majority.
71. The phrase comes from ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 17 (2d ed. 1986) (1962).
72. The possibility of this kind of impartiality with respect to contemporary disputes,
I believe, is the primary normative catalyst behind originalist and textualist approaches to
constitutional interpretation like those espoused in ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting
the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 3-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997), and ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
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means of deciding issues of significant magnitude. A coin toss, after all,
is a perfectly impartial procedure, and yet we would not trust it to decide
important issues involving membership in the democratic community or
immunities from sacrifice to the common good.73 What is missing from a
coin toss is any sense that the procedure tends to produce good or right
answers. (A coin toss produces the right answer, assuming there is one,
only fifty percent of the time.) A system of constitutional adjudication
that is widely perceived to be generating results only stochastically
probably would not be acceptable to a large majority of the public who
will be bound by those results. Of course, members of the public will
disagree about whether any given result is the right one; that is the point
of having a dispute-resolving procedure in the first place. But they
probably will agree that a random chance of getting the result right is
unacceptably low for such important matters.
And suppose the Court, over time, persistently makes decisions with
which a large majority of the public disagrees. The Court may then lose
the support of that majority and, along with it, its capacity to manage
constitutional disputes effectively. According to the Dispute-Resolution
Account, a chief function of the Court is, in essence, to placate the
minority by impartially deciding issues in which the majority is strongly
self-interested. This task of impartial decisionmaking creates the risk of
sometimes deciding against the majority and in favor of the minority; in
fact that is precisely its point. Thus its success depends on the majority's
being able to live with losing on occasion-to accept Court decisions
with which it disagrees. If, however, the majority comes to believe that
the Court in fact is partial in favor of the minority, it may as a result
refuse to accept disagreeable Court decisions. And that belief might take
hold if the overall substance of the Court's decisions diverges too widely,
over time, from the views of the political mainstream. (This worry may
be what the Court was alluding to in Casey by asserting that its
legitimacy is "a product of substance and perception.") 74 From the
perspective of dispute resolution, the Court must strike a delicate balance
between the appearance of its immediate impartiality and the impression
that its decisions, over the long run, tend to accord with majority values.
In attempting to strike this balance, our constitutional system
tempers the relative political impartiality of the Court with a diverse
array of avenues for political participation in the decision-making

73. On this basic point, see EsTLUND, supra note 66, at 66.
74. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865 (emphasis added).
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process.75 At any given moment, this participation may be somewhat
attenuated and the Court's response to it somewhat sluggish (which is,
again, part of the point of the system). Over time, however, the various
avenues combine to prevent stark divergence between the Court's
jurisprudence and public opinion. The Court's members, while not
popularly elected, are appointed by a process that is intensely political;
that process tends to produce relatively centrist Justices who hew closely
to the American mainstream.76 The Court also must rely on the elective
branches of government to implement its decisions, and on state-court
and lower federal-court judges to interpret them; these factors too tend to
channel constitutional doctrine toward the popular center. Indeed,
Congress has some degree of direct power over the Court by virtue of its
control over the Court's jurisdiction and number of members; 78 while
that power is rarely used today, the threat of its use may itself be
significant. 79 And the very process of constitutional adjudication before
the Court has become increasingly participatory as the impact of its
decisions has expanded, with large numbers of litigants representing a
broad spectrum of interests joining, intervening, or submitting amicus
curiae briefs in high-profile cases. 80
When we juxtapose these many and varied popular inputs against the
background of the Justices' relative political insulation, we get a picture
75. Two good general overviews of political influences on Court decisionmaking are
Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS
(1988), and NEAL DEViNs & Louis FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004).
76. See FISHER, supra note 75, at 135-43.
77. See id. at 221-30.
78. Article III of the Constitution does not specify the number of Justices who will
make up the Court, and it subjects the Court's appellate jurisdiction to "such Exceptions[]
and... Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. There has
never been much doubt that Congress has the power to alter the numerical composition of
the Court by ordinary legislation (so long as it does not deprive any sitting Justice of his
or her tenure), and it did so frequently during the first century of the republic, although
the number has remained at nine since 1869. See FISHER, supra note 75, at 208. The
nature and extent of Congress' power to alter the Court's jurisdiction has been more
controversial, though nobody doubts the power exists to some extent. See id. at 215-21.
79. Franklin Roosevelt's threat to "pack" the Court-increasing its membership to
allow the appointment of Justices friendly to the New Deal-may have had some
influence in the Court's mid-1930s shift to more regulation-friendly decisions. See id. at
209-15. That shift seems to have begun, however, prior to emergence of the courtpacking plan, and indeed the plan itself did not have much chance of political success.
See id.; RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT 431-32 (2008).
80. I discuss a prominent recent example-the broad participation in the litigation of
the University of Michigan affirmative-action cases-later in this article. See infra Part
IV.B.I. For general discussions of the trend toward increasingly broad participation in
constitutional litigation before the Court, see FISHER, supra note 75, at 20-24; DEVINS &
FISHER, supra note 75, at 34-37.
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of constitutional adjudication as: (a) far from perfectly impartial, but
significantly so compared with the everyday political process; and (b)
reasonably participatory and subject to long-term political controls, if
not as participatory or as political as everyday politics. Of course there
are many ifs, ands, or buts that would have to be dealt with in a more
comprehensive account; and I want to make clear what I am not claiming
here, namely that American-style constitutional adjudication is anything
close to the perfect way to resolve constitutional issues. I am offering,
rather, what I think is a plausible general interpretation of that process as
an acceptable way to avoid or resolve certain issues that might not
otherwise acceptably be resolved or avoided.
Before I connect this Dispute-Resolution Account to the Casey
Court's Legitimacy Rationale for constitutional stare decisis,8 1 allow me
to pause for two brief asides. First, I have been referring to constitutional
adjudication as a way to "resolve" certain kinds of disputes. But, the
concept of "managing" those disputes probably is more apt. Experience
shows that Court decisions by themselves very rarely actually "resolve"
constitutional disputes in the sense of finally terminating social or
political conflict over the underlying issues.82 Sometimes, as with the
issue of de jure racial segregation in public schools, a dispute is resolved
only after many years of struggle in the Court, the state and lower federal
courts, the political branches, and perhaps even the streets.8 3 Some
constitutional issues-abortion comes quickly to mind-have yet to be
resolved in any real sense despite many relevant Court decisions. 84 What
constitutional adjudication does is place these issues on a decisionmaking track that is separate, if not entirely disconnected, from the
ordinary political process, a track that (if the Dispute-Resolution Account
has any truth to it) ultimately can be more successful as a venue for
addressing those issues than ordinary politics.
Second, if we focus on constitutional adjudication's disputeresolving function (in the macrocosmic, societal sense-not just in the
obvious sense of involving competing litigants), we have a thread that
connects that process to the underlying democratic values of our political
81.
82.
83.
Brown

See 505 U.S. at 854-70.
See discussion infra.
DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 75, at 154-61, offers a concise account of the poststruggles for school desegregation; see also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL

DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF

EDUCATION 57-58, 124-34 (2004).

84. For a relatively recent account of the durability of the American abortion
controversy despite, and perhaps in part because of, the Supreme Court's frequent
interventions, see N.E.H. HULL & PETER CHARLES HOFFER, ROE V. WADE: THE ABORTION
RIGHTS CONTROVERSY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2001).
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system. Majoritarian democracy itself might be understood as a means of
resolving certain kinds of disputes: disputes about the general rules that
should guide behavior in our society, about the joint projects that we
should undertake as a society, about the duties members of our society
owe to each other, and the like-that is, the lion's share of social
disagreements we are likely to face. Democracy too features the aspects
of impartiality and participation that characterize constitutional
adjudication, albeit in different forms and in a different balance. 85 We
might then conceive of constitutionalism and democracy not as warring
dichotomous forces, as both the scholarly and popular imaginations often
portray them, but as complementary implications of the same disputeresolution impulse.
B. DisputeResolution and the Casey Rationale
If the Dispute-Resolution Account of constitutional adjudication is
plausible, then the Casey Court's Legitimacy Rationale for constitutional
stare decisis becomes plausible too. 8 6 The Casey Court suggested a
certain kind of relationship between the Court's legitimacy and public
85. Majoritarian politics typically operates according to a "one person, one vote" rule
(which is, for most purposes, constitutionally required in the United States; see, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). Unlike adjudication, "one person, one vote" is,
by definition, completely impartial with respect to individual participants in a decision
procedure, in that it allocates decision-making authority equally among them.
Majoritarian politics also typically is much more broadly participatory than constitutional
adjudication; in the most recent U.S. presidential election, for example, more than 125
million people cast votes, outstripping the numbers of participants in constitutional
litigation by several orders of magnitude. See http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/votes.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). By the same token, however,
majoritarian politics also (by definition) operates by majority rule, which is, in a sense,
partial with respect to groups: In any given vote, the majority as a group always has more
power than the minority as a group. And, since members of the political majority will be
affected by the results of the votes they cast, political majorities inevitably engage in selfjudging, a fact recognized by Madison when he noted in FederalistNo. 10 that citizens
and legislators not only are "advocates and parties" but also are "themselves the judges"
of disputes determined by majoritarian politics. James Madison, Federalist No. 10, in
JAMES MADISON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 123, 124-25 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(1788). One application of constitutional adjudication might be to temper this majority
self-judging problem. And while democratic politics is broadly participatory, it is not
necessarily deeply so: Most citizens do not have a meaningful opportunity, by
themselves, to influence public policy. A single vote cannot make a difference among
125 million; for its part, political speech typically requires an expensive platform in order
to be heard. Constitutional (and other forms of) adjudication may serve to fill gaps in
democratic politics by giving citizens a chance to participate more consequentially in
addressing issues that matter to them.
86. See 505 U.S. at 854-70.
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opinion: For the Court to operate legitimately in constitutional cases, the
public (or at least a sufficiently large portion of it) must believe that the
Court is deciding those cases in a certain way, namely according to
"principle" rather than political or social expediency. 8 7 As I suggested in
the previous Part, it might seem mysterious why the Court's legitimacy
should turn on the public's perception of it. Is it not the whole point of a
politically insulated judiciary to immunize the Court from the effects of
public opinion?
The Dispute-Resolution Account makes this possibility less
mysterious. On that account, the Court's legitimacy depends in large part
on its capacity to avoid or resolve (or, better, manage) certain disputes
more successfully than they can be managed through ordinary
democratic means. And the Court's capacity to acceptably manage these
disputes itself turns in part on public perception, namely on a widespread
belief that the Court is deciding cases in a relatively impartial way. A key
ingredient in the necessary perception of impartiality may be what the
Casey Court refers to as "principle": 88 the Court's practice of guiding its
decisions with norms laid down by previous generations, perhaps
including norms embodied in longstanding precedents of the Court itself.
A Court seen as deriving its decisions from longstanding norms is, to that
extent, a Court that is impartial with respect to the competing sides of a
current political controversy-and thus a Court (potentially) capable of
managing that controversy acceptably.
Frequent overrulings, however-or overrulings that, in context, may
be interpreted as surrenders to current political forces-are likely to
undermine the impression that the Court typically decides based on
impartial principle. It seems implausible that constitutional norms laid
down by the Framers or by prior Courts can change suddenly and
radically, or that a Court seriously interested in interpreting and applying
those norms could deviate wildly in the course of doing so. A more likely
explanation is that the Court is merely blowing with the political
winds-precisely what the Court must not be seen as doing if its disputeresolution function is to be effective and its existence therefore
legitimate. The imperative of avoiding this impression thus serves as a
powerful reason to resist overruling precedents in constitutional cases.
In this way the Dispute-Resolution Account lends gravitas to the
Casey Court's Legitimacy Rationale for constitutional stare decisis. Does
that account also tell us anything useful about the practice, not of
overruling precedents, but of underruling them?
87. Id. at 865-66.
88. See id.
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IV. UNDERRULING AND CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The difference between overruling and underruling is, of course, not
what the Court is doing, but what the Court says it is doing. And the
primary source of information for most Americans about what the Court
does is what the Court says it does in its written opinions. More
precisely, most Americans' primary source of information about the
Court is the media's reporting of what the Court says it does in its
opinions. This is simply a function of the fact that most nonlawyers,
indeed most lawyers other than those who practice or teach constitutional
law, lack the time and expertise necessary to parse Court opinions and
analyze their treatment of precedents. What this means, among other
things, is that if the Court announces in an opinion that it is overruling a
constitutional precedent, most Americans will assume that it has in fact
overruled a precedent; but if the Court does not announce that it is
overruling a precedent, most Americans will assume that it has not in
fact done so.
This reality has implications-some obvious, some more subtle-for
the relationship between underruling and the Court's legitimacy that is
suggested by the Dispute-Resolution Account and its adjunct, the
Legitimacy Rationale for constitutional stare decisis. The DisputeResolution Account and the Legitimacy Rationale hold that public
perception of the Court's legitimacy is likely to be undermined by
frequent or high-profile overrulings; 89 but public perception cannot be
swayed by overrulings if the public is not aware of them. The DisputeResolution Account thus creates, or reveals, an incentive for the Court to
overrule precedents it believes to be wrong without being seen to do sothat is, to underrule. By tying the Court's legitimacy to public beliefs
about its decision-making, the Casey Legitimacy Rationale, and the
Dispute-Resolution Account that animates it, seem to justify the practice
of underruling in a way that other rationales for stare decisis cannot.
But in fact things are not so simple.
A. UnderrulingandImpartiality
Casey argues that the Court's being seen to frequently overrule
constitutional precedents threatens public perception of its impartiality,
and thus compromises the Court's legitimacy as a resolver of
constitutional disputes. 90 This suggests the possibility of a sort of
arbitrage between perception and reality: By underruling--overruling
89. See id. at 865-68.
90. Id.
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without saying so-the Court might gain the benefits of overruling
(declining to follow a precedent the Court believes was wrongly decided)
without suffering its costs (diminished public perception of the Court's
impartiality). If a central function of constitutional stare decisis really is
to maintain the popular belief that the Court is impartial, 9 that function
is not threatened by underruling. Thus, underruling appears wholly
compatible with Casey's Legitimacy Rationale. Indeed, on that rationale,
underruling seems to be normatively permissible in a way that overruling
is not. The Legitimacy Rationale thus differs markedly from the
Noninstrumental Rationale, 92 on which underruling and overruling are
equally egregious, and from the Predictability Rationale, 93 on which
underruling is, if anything, more normatively problematic than
overruling.
Notice, though, that the compatibility between underruling and
perceived impartiality depends on whether the technique of underruling
actually works-on whether it actually convinces the public, or most of
it, that the Court has not overruled a precedent. And it is true that there is
perhaps less reason for skepticism in this regard than on the
Predictability Rationale. The value of predictability generated by
adherence to precedent depends primarily on the views of legal
professionals-lawyers-who are experts at understanding what the
Court has done and how it impacts the law in a particular subject area.
Under-the-table overruling seems unlikely to fool the professionals, at
least in the medium to long term, and so it probably threatens
predictability at least as much as straight overruling does, as I suggested
in Part 11. 94 The Legitimacy Rationale, however, rests on the perception
of the Court in the eyes of the general public, 95 not in the eyes of a small
group of legal experts. Because most of the general public relies on
media-filtered accounts of the Court's own descriptions of its decisions,
it seems plausible that underruling might fool the masses even if it does
not fool the pros.
I remain somewhat skeptical about the feasibility of underruling as a
means of upholding the Court's perceived impartiality. Most journalists
who follow the Court are experts, too, and often they report underrulings
as the threats to precedent that they really are. 9 6 For example, the New

91. Id.
92. See supra Part II.A.
93. See supra Part II.B.

94. Id.
95. See supra Part I.C. See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-68.
96. See discussion infra.
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York Times articles reporting the decisions in Gonzales v. Carhart,97
Wisconsin Right to Life, 98 and Parents Involved 9 all emphasized the
respective rulings' deviations from existing doctrine, and their headlines
focused on the decisions' bottom lines: either an upholding or an
invalidation of some controversial government policy. 0 0 And if the
Court builds on these decisions in future cases, departing even more
diametrically from the precedents supposedly left intact, it seems likely
the public will take notice; the Court will, after all, be causing an evergreater on-the-ground impact in the highly visible and controversial
arenas of abortion, campaign finance reform, and affirmative action. That
is more or less what happened in the school desegregation cases decided
by the Court during the first half of the twentieth century: The Court
gradually undermined the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson'°' in a series of cases culminating in Brown v. Board of
02
Education1
-never once directly overruling Plessy, not even in
03
Brown 1 -but this indirect approach did not forestall a huge public
outcry when Brown was decided.

97. 505 U.S. 127.
98. 127 S. Ct. 2652.
99. 127 S. Ct. 2738.
100. See David Stout, Supreme Court Upholds Ban on Abortion Procedure, N.Y.
TIMES (April 18, 2007), availableat http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2009)
(describing Carhartas "a change of course from a Supreme Court ruling in 2000, when
the lineup of justices was different"); Linda Greenhouse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Justices
Loosen Ad Restrictions in Campaign Finance Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2007),
availableat http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (describing the decision
as "a sharp turn away from campaign finance regulation" and noting that the "dissenters'
argument that the court had effectively overruled its 2003 decision in [McConnell]...
found agreement among election law experts"); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Limit the Use
of Race in School Plans for Integration, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2007), available at
http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (citing Justice Breyer's assertion that
"the decision was a 'radical' step away from settled law").
101. 163 U.S. 537.
102. 347 U.S. 483; see supra note 49.
103. The Court in Brown "rejected" "any language in Plessy ... contrary" to its
finding that segregation was psychologically damaging to black schoolchildren. 347 U.S.
at 494-95. But it confined its formal holding, rejecting "separate but equal," to "the field
of public education," id. at 495, and thus never expressly overruled Plessy, which
involved segregation on railroad trains, or the doctrine of "separate but equal" more
broadly. Id. In a series of subsequent decisions, however, the Court perfunctorily applied
Brown to invalidate dejure segregation in non-educational contexts. See, e.g., Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (invalidating segregation
of public beaches and bathhouses); Homes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(regarding public golf courses); and Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (regarding
city buses).
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Still, I am prepared to admit that reporters for the New York Times
might not be typical of journalists who report on the Court, and that
readers of the Times might not be typical of Americans generally. And I
recognize the possibility that the Court, by underruling and thus allowing
its departure from precedent to sink in slowly rather than splashing down
suddenly, can take the edge off what is in fact an act of overruling, thus
at least mitigating any damage to the Court's impartial image if not
wholly preventing such damage. Indeed, I have to assume that a primary
explanation for the Court's tactic of underruling in Gonzales, Wisconsin
Right to Life, and ParentsInvolved is that the Court itself believes this is
possible. But I nonetheless think that underruling ultimately is
incompatible with the basis for the Court's legitimacy, understood
according to the Dispute-Resolution Account.
B. Underrulingand Participation
The difficulty is that the practice of underruling poses a significant
threat to the efficacy of political participation in constitutional
adjudication. This element of participation, remember, is vital to the
Dispute-Resolution Account of the Court's legitimacy: Mere impartiality
cannot ensure that the Court, over time, will produce results that a
substantial majority of the public can accept. The various avenues for
political input into the adjudicative process assure that the substance of
the Court's decisionmaking doesn't depart too widely from the mediumto long-term democratic mainstream.
In order for the public and its political representatives to participate
in constitutional decisionmaking, they must, as it were, know the rules of
the game they will be playing. But the Court, by underruling, conceals
those rules; it plays one game while purporting to play another. This has
the effect of devaluing participation in the process.
1. Direct Participationin Litigation
Consider first the effect of underruling on direct citizen participation
in constitutional litigation. From a dispute-resolution perspective, a
primary advantage of litigation that is broadly participatory (through
joinder, intervention, and amicus briefs) is that it can place the particular
constitutional case being decided in a larger political and social context.
The Court then can do a better job of taking that context into accountthe likely real-world impact of its decision, how the decision might be
publicly received-in deciding the case. In essence, broad participation
can inject elements of the political, the social, and the moral into a
proceeding that otherwise might be narrowly and drily legal. The result
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should be constitutional decision-making that is unlikely-or less likely
than without this kind of participation-to stray very far from the
democratic mainstream, and thus is more likely to be publicly acceptable
in the medium to long run.
For example, the lawsuits that ultimately produced the Court's 2003
affirmative-action decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger' 4 and Gratz v.
Bollinger10 5 featured remarkably broad and diverse participation by
individuals, groups, and organizations interested in the underlying
constitutional issues. The plaintiffs in each case were white applicants
denied admission to, respectively, the University of Michigan Law
School (in Grutter)10 6 and the University's undergraduate college (in
Gratz),10 7 allegedly because race-based affirmative-action programs
admitted less-qualified minority applicants. In each case, the named
plaintiffs were certified by the trial court as representatives of a larger
class of similarly situated applicants.108 In each case, the trial court
allowed intervention, as defendants, by a large number of proaffirmative-action students, prospective students, and groups - forty-one
intervenors in Grutter, seventeen in Gratz.109
104. 539 U.S. 306.
105. 539 U.S. 244.
106. 539 U.S. at 306.
107. 539 U.S. at 244.
108. The Grutterclass was defined as:
all persons who (A) applied for and were not granted admission to the
University of Michigan Law School for the academic years since (and
including) 1995 until the time that judgment is entered [in the lawsuit]; and (B)
were members of those racial or ethnic groups, including Caucasian, that
Defendants treated less favorably in considering their applications for
admission to the Law School.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 824 (2001). The Gratz class was defined as:
[t)hose individuals who applied for and were not granted admission to the
College of Literature, Science & the Arts of the University of Michigan for all
academic years from 1995 forward and who are members of those racial or
ethnic groups, including Caucasian, that defendants treated less favorably on
the basis of race in considering their application for admission.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 814 n.2 (2000).
109. In Grutter:
41 individuals and three pro-affirmative action student groups... intervene[d]
in the case as defendants. The individual intervenors include[d] 21
undergraduate students of various races who ... attend[ed] the University of
Michigan, Wayne State University, the University of California at Berkeley, or
Diablo Valley Community College in Pleasant Hill, California, all of whom
plan[ned] to apply to the law school for admission; five black students who...
attend[ed] Cass Technical High School or Northwestern High School in Detroit
and who plan[ned] to apply to the law school for admission; twelve students of
various races who . . . attend[ed] the law school; a paralegal and a Latino
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And the Supreme Court, after it granted certiorari in both cases,
allowed the filing of ninety-one different amicus curiae briefs in either
Grutter, Gratz, or both: seventy supporting the University, seventeen
supporting the plaintiffs, and four supporting neither party. 10 (The actual
number of amici was even higher than this, as many of the amicus briefs
were filed on behalf of multiple parties.) The amici supporting the
University included-to name only a few-the NAACP "Inc." Fund; the
ACLU; the AFL-CIO; a group of "former high-ranking officers and
civilian leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps";"'
more than twenty states and territories; various other law schools,
colleges, universities, and administrators and faculty thereof; members of
Congress; a long list of major corporations; the governor of Michigan; a
coalition of Indian tribes; the American Psychological Association and
the American Sociological Association; groups of minority lawyers and
law students; and the College Board.' ' 2 Amici on the other side included
a number of conservative think-tanks and activist organizations such as
the Cato Institute and the Center for Individual Freedom; various
scholarly groups, including a coalition of anti-affirmative-action law
professors; the State of Florida and its governor, Jeb Bush; and the3
United States government as represented by the Solicitor General.",
(The Solicitor General also participated in the oral argument of both
cases, in each case splitting time with the plaintiffs' counsel.)
It is, of course, impossible to say for sure how much any given
decision of the Court has been influenced by the participation of others
besides the original litigants (or by that of the original litigants, for that
graduate student at the University of Texas at Austin who intend[ed] to apply to
the law school for admission; and a black graduate student at the University of
Michigan who [was] a member of the Defend Affirmative Action Party.
137 F. Supp. 2d at 824-25. The pro-affirmative action groups were "United For Equality
and Affirmative Action (UEAA), the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action By Any
Means Necessary (BAMN), and Law Students for Affirmative Action (LSAA)." Id. at
824 n.4. In Gratz, the intervenors were:
seventeen African American and Latino students who ha[d] applied for, or
intend[ed] to apply for, admission to the University, joined by the Citizens for
Affirmative Action's Preservation, a nonprofit organization whose stated
mission is to preserve opportunities in higher education for African American
and Latino students in Michigan.
122 F. Supp. 2d at 815.
110. This does not count the three amicus briefs filed in support of the petition for
certiorari in one or the other case.
111. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02516) 2003 WL 1787554.
112. See Gruter,539 U.S. 306; see also Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
113. See 539 U.S. 306; see also 539 U.S. 244.
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matter). In Grutter and Gratz, though, it seems likely that broad
participation made a real difference. In her opinion for the Grutter
majority, Justice O'Connor cited amicus briefs filed by, respectively, a
group of law school deans and a coalition of colleges for the point that a
great many schools have relied on the permissibility of affirmative action
to achieve diversity." 4 Later, Justice O'Connor rested her holding that
racial diversity is a compelling interest in part on assertions by corporate
and military amici of diversity's importance in global business and in
military training. "5 It may then be no accident that the Court's decisions
in Grutter and Gratz-allowing affirmative action for the purpose of
diversity, but approving the use of race only as one among multiple
factors and disapproving anything that looks like a numerical
"quota"11 6 -probably accord with the mainstream views of the American
public on the issue.
Why did Grutter and Gratz attract so much public attention and
participation? Because there was a widespread perception that important
issues of constitutional principle were at stake. The Court had not
decided a case involving affirmative action in education since Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke' 1 7 in 1978-the case that spawned
the "diversity" rationale'" 8 -and thus the University of Michigan cases
were seen as likely vehicles for a broad Court decision either approving
or rejecting affirmative action. 9 The matter was viewed not as a
technical legal issue of interest primarily to lawyers and perhaps a small
group of potential litigants, but rather as a fundamental question of
morality and policy of vital importance to society as a whole. This sense
of deep normative importance and broad social significance was
reflected not only in the quantity of participation in the cases, but also in

114. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 323.
115. See id. at 330-31.
116. See Grutter,539 U.S. 306; see also Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
117. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
118. Justice Powell, who provided the crucial fifth vote to invalidate the set-aside
program challenged in Bakke, wrote approvingly in his opinion of the diversity rationale,
id. at 311-15, and of the use of race as a "plus" factor in admissions, id. at 315-19.
Because the other four Justices who voted to invalidate the Bakke plan did so on statutory
rather than constitutional grounds, see id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), Justice Powell's opinion became the touchstone for designing and
evaluating affirmative-action programs prior to Grutter and Gratz. Post-Bakke decisions
in non-educational contexts had effectively eliminated most rationales other than
diversity as possible "compelling interests" to justify affirmative action. See City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
119. Id.; see also discussion infra.
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morality, policy, and history featured
the ambitious arguments based
120 on
in many of the amicus briefs.
I use the example of Grutter and Gratz to suggest how things might
be different if the Court adopts a practice of frequent underruling in
constitutional cases. Underruling seems likely to dilute the intensity of
the constitutional issues the Court decides, or at least the public
perception of that intensity. By underruling Grutter in the Parents
Involved case, for example, the Court has effectively shifted the focus in
affirmative-action litigation away from broad and deep questions of
morality and policy (What are the social benefits or moral goods of
affirmative action? What are its costs or evils? Do the former outweigh
the latter?) and toward relatively narrow, technical issues involving the
application of law to fact (Does a case present facts that are sufficiently
similar to Grutter's "unique context of higher education"' 12 1 for that
decision rather than Parents Involved to control?). It is difficult to
imagine these legalistic questions exciting the kind of broad and
enthusiastic public participation in future cases that was present in
Grutterand Gratz.
Of course, constitutional adjudication often does boil down to
relatively narrow, technical issues: Once a germinal case has been
decided, subsequent cases typically involve lawyerly analogizing or
distinguishing of that precedent by, for example, arguing over precisely
how an applicable level of scrutiny should be applied. This is, formally
speaking, what the Court claimed to be doing in Parents Involved with
respect to the strict scrutiny mandated by Grutter.122 But this kind of
narrowing of the issues usually occurs only after the Court has spoken
reasonably clearly on the underlying issue of constitutional principle.
120. The NAACP "Inc." Fund and the ACLU, for instance, argued broadly that
affirmative action was necessary to remediate the lingering societal effects of historical
discrimination. See Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and
the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) 2003 WL 398820. A coalition of

corporations contended that affirmative action was vital to the success of American
business in the global marketplace. See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American
Businesses in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos.
02-241, 02-516) 2003 WL 399056. A group of law students argued that racial diversity
contributed to "a wide, robust exchange of ideas, essential to the discovery of truth and to

the critical debate necessary to legal education." See Brief of 13,922 Current Law
Students at Accredited American Law Schools as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) 2003 WL 554404.
There are many equally apposite examples from among the 91 amicus briefs filed in the

cases.
121. ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755.
122. Id.at 2752-54.
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Underruling, as in Parents Involved, disguises macrocosmic changes in
constitutional principle as microcosmic applications of existing doctrine.
If the Court in ParentsInvolved had acknowledged the inconsistency in
principle between that decision and Grutter, future affirmative-action
cases might take on the importance that Grutter had: Litigants and amici
might see them as opportunities to participate in the continuing evolution
of fundamental tenets of constitutional law. As it is-the Parents
Involved Court having purported only to apply and refine Grutter's
diversity rationale rather than to reject it123-future cases might be
viewed not as components of evolving constitutional principle, but
simply as technocratic exercises in lawyerly craft, and the kind of wide
and deep involvement we saw in Grutterand Gratz will be missing.
In short: Underruling threatens to stifle, by misdirection, meaningful
public participation in constitutional adjudication. Indeed, it is difficult to
shake the suspicion that this is a large part of its point.
2. IndirectParticipationthroughAppointments andImplementation
Much the same can be said about the effects of underruling on
indirect forms of political participation in constitutional adjudication,
through the judicial appointments process at the front end and political
implementation of Court decisions on the back end. Consider first the
politics of appointments to the Court. A primary focus of the
appointments process typically is the nominee's views on the correctness
of high-profile constitutional decisions (such as Roe v. Wade) 124 or
constitutional doctrines more generally (such as the right to privacy). 125
While nominees these days tend to be cagey in responding to these

123. Id. at 2754-57.
124. 410 U.S. 113.
125. For examples from the two most recent Court nomination hearings, of Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, see Roberts Fields Senators' Queriesfor Second Day,
CNN (Sept. 14, 2005), availableat http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/13/roberts.hearings/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (regarding Roberts on Roe and right to
privacy); Adam Liptak, Roberts Drops Hints in "Precedent" Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 2005, § 1, at 30, available at http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2009)
(regarding Roberts on Roe); "When a Precedent is Reaffirmed, That Strengthens the
Precedent," N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 2006, § A, at 26, availableat http://www.nytimes.com
(last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (regarding Alito on Roe). For examples from probably the
most contentious judicial nomination hearings in American history-those relating to
Robert Bork in 1987-see Ronald J. Ostrow & David Lauter, Bork Assures Senators He
Respects Precedent; Testifies He Was Acting as "Theorist" in Criticizing High Court
Decisions; Unsure on Abortion Issue, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 16, 1987, pt. 1, at 1.
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inquiries, 126 usually a fairly clear picture of their jurisprudential beliefs
opinions, work as an
can be pieced together from their lower-court
1 27
attorney, academic writings, and the like.
Imagine, however, a world in which the Court makes significant use
of underruling in place of overruling. That would be a world in which
many areas of constitutional doctrine would appear to remain essentially
unchanged for long periods of time, subject only to the interstitial
tinkering that underruling wrongly purports to be. A world in which
basic constitutional doctrine rarely changes is a world in which judicial
nominees' views on the soundness or wisdom of that basic doctrine lose
much of their relevance; it is a specialists' world, a lawyers' world, in
which Court appointments seem likely to get substantially less political
and public attention than they now (justifiably) receive. But of course
this impression of constancy in constitutional doctrine, and thus of the
limited importance of judicial appointments, would be a false one. The
Court would in fact be making wholesale changes to constitutional law,
and the individual members of the Court would of course be instrumental
in making those changes; it's only that the public and the political
branches would not clearly perceive these facts. The connection between
popular participation and the Court's decision-making, and thus between
the real content of that decision-making and what the majority, over
time, finds acceptable, would become attenuated.
Perhaps somewhat less hypothetically, consider the fact that every
contemporary Supreme Court nominee inevitably is asked, multiple
126. For examples, see Roberts Fields Senators' Queriesfor Second Day, supra note
125 (Roberts); Liptak, supra note 125 (Roberts); "When a Precedentis Reaffirmed, That
Strengthens the Precedent," supra note 125 (Alito); on Alito's evasiveness generally
(and for a comparison with that of other recent nominees), see Jim Puzzanghera, The Art
of Saying Nothing, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 15, 2006, at PE 1. Bork was unusually
frank and straightforward with his answers to Senators' questions, see Ostrow & Lauter,
supra note 125, a fact that may have doomed his nomination given the tenor of his views,
see Puzzanghera, supra.
127. Bork, for example, had written extensively on constitutional issues in more than
two decades as a government lawyer, law professor, and court of appeals judge by the
time he was nominated to the Court in 1987; his paper trail laid the groundwork for a
titanic battle over his nomination. See Edward Walsh & Al Kamen, Ideological Stakes
High in Bork Fight; On Eve of Hearings, Both Sides Seem Eager to Keep Calm, WASH.
POST, Sept. 13, 1987, § 1, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Regardfor Precedent Will Be Critical
Issue; Study Lists 31 Areas of Bork's Disagreement,WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1987, § 1, at
A9. Alito too had an extensive written record as a court of appeals judge and government
lawyer. See Adam Liptak, Issues and (Possible) Answers: A Primer on the Alito
Hearings,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at Al, available at http://nytimes.com (last visited
Feb. 21, 2009). Roberts' record as an appellate judge was more sparse, but his work as a
Reagan Administration lawyer provided substantial fodder. See Roberts Fields Senators'
Queriesfor Second Day, supra note 125.
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times, about his or her attitude toward stare decisis in constitutional
cases. 128 Underruling allows a nominee to profess his or her strong
commitment to the principle of stare decisis and then, as a Justice,
effectively to ignore that principle without being seen as breaking a
promise. If this tactic succeeds, it pushes the confirmation process, and
the political participation it embodies, ever closer to irrelevance.
The misdirection of underruling also may take its toll at the
implementation end. An important aspect of political participation in
constitutional adjudication is the ability of the elective branches of
government to assess the real-world consequences of constitutional
decisions and determine how to deal with them. For example, the Court's
invalidation of a type of affirmative action in the Bakke decision, 129 one
with a broad remedial rationale and a methodology of numerical setasides, inspired the development of diversity-focused, "race-plus"
programs like that eventually upheld in Grutter.130 A dialectic process
like this, however-a process by which the Court renders a decision, the
political branches respond to that decision, the Court then responds to the
political branches' actions, and so on-requires that the political
branches know what the consequences of a Court decision actually are.
How are public universities and school districts now supposed to respond
to ParentsInvolved? 3 1 If that decision really is the de facto overruling of
Grutter I fear it to be, it will lay the groundwork for piecemeal judicial
invalidation of a wide variety of affirmative-action programs that would
have been upheld under an honest application of Grutter.But universities
and school districts cannot be sure of this until it happens; they cannot
know, until the Court tells them so, whether their particular use of
diversity is justifiable under the reasoning of Grutter or impermissible
under that of Parents Involved. And so they will have difficulty being
proactive in bringing their programs into line with the Court's reading of
the Constitution.
Nor, in the face of an underruling, can citizens and their political
representatives know whether to mount political resistance to the Court's
128. For extensive examples, see Marcus, supra note 127 (Bork); Ostrow & Lauter,
supranote 125 (Bork); Roberts Fields Senators' Queriesfor Second Day,supra note 125
(Roberts); Liptak, supra note 137 (Roberts); Liptak, supra note 127 (Alito); "When a
Precedent Is Reaffirmed, That Strengthens the Precedent," supra note 127 (Alito). As the
contexts of most of these examples suggest, "respect for precedent" often is used as a
stalking horse for "support for Roe v. Wade." See Liptak, supra note 125 (asserting that
senators asking Roberts about precedent "talked in a sort of code. Whenever they talked
about precedent, they were talking about Roe").
129. 438 U.S. at 318-20.
130. 539 U.S. at 334-38.
131. See id. See also ParentsInvolved, 127 S. Ct. at 2752-59.
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(unintelligible) reading of the Constitution. We now see the widespread,
sometimes violent resistance to the Court's desegregation decision in
Brown v. Board of Education 32 as wrongheaded, even evil, but our
reaction seems largely a product of our contemporary recognition that
Brown was in fact rightly decided. We are unlikely to have the same
strongly negative perspective on popular resistance to pre-Civil War
decisions ordering the return of fugitive slaves,1 33 or to the Court's
disastrous DredScott ruling,' 34 or to the "separate but equal" doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson135 that Brown effectively overruled. The fates of Scott
and Plessy-and of Lochner v. New York, 136 which eventually was
swamped by the tide of pro-regulation public opinion during the New
Deal-show that popular and political resistance of various kinds to
Court decisions can, over time, change the course of constitutional law.
That kind of participation is likely to be dampened (though probably not
extinguished entirely) by underruling, because underruling makes the
target of resistance that much harder to identify.

There is, then, good reason to think that the apparent compatibility of
underruling with Casey's Legitimacy Rationale for constitutional stare
decisis, and with the Dispute-Resolution Account of the Court's
legitimacy that underwrites that rationale, is illusory. Underruling might
preserve the appearance of the Court's impartiality, but only if it works.
And if it works, underruling probably reduces the efficacy of popular
participation in constitutional adjudication, which over time may be as
great a threat to the Court's legitimacy as a breakdown in public
perception of its impartiality. The Court cannot acceptably resolve
constitutional disputes if it blows back and forth with every political

132. For a description of the many-faceted resistance to Brown, see OGLETREE, supra
note 83, at 124-34.
133. On abolitionist resistance to enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, see ROBERT
M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 214-19 (1975).
134. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). For analyses of the political and historical
significance of Dred Scott, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCoTT CASE: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978); see also DON E. FEHRENBACHER,
SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(1981).
135. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Resistance to "separate but equal" came primarily in the
form of legal challenges to the doctrine, which culminated in Brown. See supra note 49;
see also supra,text accompanying note 103.
136. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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wind; but it also can't do so if it loses touch with the substantive values
of the democratic majority that must live with its decisions.
So underruling flunks the legitimacy test; it flunks the predictability
test; and it performs no better as a way of treating like cases alike than
straight overruling. Which begs the obvious question: Why then would
the Court do it?
V. So WHY UNDERRULE? (OR, "IN THE LONG RUN WE ARE ALL DEAD")

I have suggested already some possible motivations for under-thetable overruling. For a Court that accepts the Legitimacy Rationale for
stare decisis, underruling may allow the Court to have its cake and eat it
too, preserving the appearance of impartiality while still correcting what
the Court perceives as a wrongly decided precedent. More mundanely,
given the intense focus on stare decisis in contemporary judicial
confirmation hearings, underruling (if it works) avoids the impression
that recently confirmed Justices are casually overturning nearly as-recent
precedents. This fact may go a long way toward explaining the particular
underrulings in Gonzales v. Carhart, Wisconsin Right to Life, and
ParentsInvolved: 137 all three decisions underruled precedents that were
less than a decade old, and in all three the two newest members of the
Court (Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito)-both of whom
were confirmed after 38the underruled precedent was decided-joined the
underruling opinion. 1
Underruling also may reduce the social and political salience of the
Court's decision-making, freeing up some room for the Court to pursue
its agenda without the public and the elective branches looking quite so
closely over its shoulder. In this sense, underruling may simply be a
logical extension of a trend toward minimalism-narrowness and
gradualism in the construction of constitutional doctrine-that appeared
in the Rehnquist Court and was led by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.
There are good reasons in favor of judicial minimalism, as well as
reasons to be cautious about it, that have little or nothing to do with how
the Court is perceived. 3 9 But both minimalism and underruling do, or
137. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124; Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652; ParentsInvolved,
127 S. Ct. 2738.
138. Id.
139. For an influential description and evaluation of this "judicial minimalism," see
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999). For further normative evaluation of minimalism, see Christopher J. Peters,
Assessing the New JudicialMinimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1454 (2000); Christopher J.
Peters & Neal Devins, Alexander Bickel and the New JudicialMinimalism, in KENNEm
D.
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may, affect perceptions of the Court, fostering the impression that the
Court is not doing much to change constitutional law (an impression that
is reasonably accurate with respect to minimalism but false with respect
to underruling). The possibility that this impression is useful to the Court
might conceivably explain, at least in part, the recent emergence of both
techniques. (It might also shed some light on another phenomenon
by Dean Chemerinsky, namely the Court's ever-dwindling
pointed 14out
0
docket.)

And then there is the possibility that the Court's internal dynamics
sometimes push toward underruling. It may be that underruling rather
than outright overruling is necessary in some cases to get that fifth vote
for a result. But of course this just recasts the question as: Why would
that fifth Justice favor underruling rather than overruling? The factors
suggested above might explain the actions of individual Justices as well
as those of the Court as a corporate entity-indeed they could not apply
in any other way, as the Court is simply the sum of its individual
members.
If my analysis in this article is correct, underruling probably hurts the
Court's legitimacy in the medium to long term. Eventually the public is
likely to catch on to the fact that the Court has been drastically changing
constitutional law without saying so-perhaps as the Court upholds (or
denies review of) ever-more-aggressive abortion restrictions despite lip
service to Stenberg14 1 and Roe v. Wade, 142 or strikes down ever-moremodest affirmative-action programs and campaign-finance regulations
43
despite lip service, respectively, to Grutter and McConnell. Then the
public and its political representatives may feel alienated from what is,
after all, their constitutional law. This kind of alienation can be
threatening to the Court, as the experience of the New Deal suggests.
Why would the Court risk long-term damage to its reputation and
efficacy for the short-term gratification of overruling without saying so?
Perhaps the Court's conservative majority is making a bet that the trend
of public opinion on these issues (abortion, affirmative action, campaign
finance reform, perhaps others) is moving in its favor. The results of the
2008 presidential election make it somewhat less likely, one might think,
that such a bet will pay off-and note that if the Court loses the bet, its
strategy of underruling actually will make it easier for subsequent
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN

DuFcuLTY, AND

CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 45-70 (2005).

140.
141.
142.
143.

See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 948-53.
530 U.S. 914.
410 U.S. 113.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 306; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.
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Courts, staffed by new Justices with different views on these issues, to
reverse course in these areas. Subsequent Courts, after all, will not have
to overrule precedent in order to do so; they can simply ignore previous
underrulings and revert to faithful applications of the original, neverformally-overruled precedential decisions. In this respect underruling is a
double-edged sword.
Or perhaps the Court's majority simply agrees with John Maynard
Keynes that "[i]n the long run we are all dead."' 144 As I write this, John
Roberts has yet to turn 55 and Samuel Alito has yet to turn 60. Their
respective runs on the Court may be very long indeed; and so there may
be plenty of time for the tactic of under-the-table overruling, if it persists,
to come back and haunt them.

144. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (Prometheus Books
2000) (1924) (emphasis in original altered).

